STAFF EDIT: Remembering Mumbai

It has been more than a week since the Indian city of Mumbai suffered the terror wrought by at least 10 terrorist gunmen. It is now becoming clear that the terrorists who killed at least 172 people at various hotels and public places operated with far more coordination than the government authorities charged with defending the city had on their side. Though the event was not an ‘invasion’ or ‘India’s 9/11’ as some authorities suggested, the attack shared one similarity with the attacks that devastated the United States in 2001: It taught the government that preparation rather than blind retaliation is the only answer to terrorism.

After Sept. 11, 2001, the United States searched frantically for answers. When it became apparent that the terrorist organization Al Qaeda was behind the attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan in hopes of destroying the group’s base of operations. But as U.S. commitment to rooting out terrorists took a back seat to the war in Iraq, American intelligence services lost their grip on the situation in Afghanistan. A Sept. 10, 2006 Washington Post article reported the trail behind Osama Bin Laden went ‘cold’ after authorities struck at the terrorist leader without first garnering good intelligence. This approach failed, and more than seven years later, the threat of international terrorism has only increased.

The attacks in Mumbai were different from Sept. 11 in many ways: The United States suffered more casualties on that day, and India had faced many more terrorist attacks before gunmen fired on innocent bystanders last month. India would do well to learn from the errors of the United States, however. Indian officials in the past week have called the attacks an invasion, using rhetoric aimed at pointing out Pakistan’s role in the situation. Though this is likely true, Indian officials should focus their efforts on infiltrating Pakistani terrorist cells rather than pointing fingers. A New York Times article published Sunday suggested local police revealed the identity of one of India’s own undercover intelligence agents thinking he was responsible for the attacks. American officials have made the same blunders, but these mistakes were a wakeup call for them to reform their operations.

If officials in New Delhi are truly dedicated to solving the problems that allowed such an attack to take place, they should move forward with a clear mind and make calculated, rational decisions. With international terrorism, there is no such thing as military deterrence because terrorists want to die and are not afraid of reprisals. The only effective response to a terrorist attack uses more coordinated security efforts and open lines of communication to strike at terrorists when the time is right, not when it is politically convenient.