Max Weber defined a state to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force by institutions. For example, only the government can have a police force or an army, private citizens or organizations cannot. However, increased privatization, advancements in technology and shifting social contexts mean states have diluted this monopoly over violence to non-state actors.
Many developed countries like the US and UK have outsourced security functions of police and military to the private sector. This is further influenced by their increasing difficulty in recruiting sufficient and qualified personnel; private contractors have therefore become integral in police and military operations despite the absence of much-needed oversight.
At the same time, the state’s own failure to guarantee order in zones of conflict like Afghanistan and Iraq creates space for groups like rebels, militias and gangs, which the states must either fight or appease. This outlines the limitations of the state’s monopoly on violence in societies attempting to transition away from war.
Moreover, technological progress has provided states with tools to delegate its monopoly over violence. With social media acting as an echo chamber of information it is easier now to manipulate, control and assert state-oriented narratives.
An alternative to censorship and persecution has been found in the form of misinformation by targeted advertising meant to arouse passion and foster fear. That does not mean that social media causes violence — only that it can increase the possibility of non-state violence. It becomes easier to apply the brand of treason to those who even appear to oppose the government, or simply those who differ with its objectives.
This use of people and technology to generate fear seems to be replacing legitimated coercion and violence and the decentralized delegation of violence is reducing the burden of government to law and order. Since it is very difficult to establish who exactly instigated a rumor or a propaganda with certainty, states can pretend to be helpless when it suits them, such as in this case.
We generally make judgements about violence depending on its context. For example, if it takes place because of a dispute, then it may become socially acceptable; it is this context that the state seeks to change in its delegation of violence to non-state actors.
The narrative of preserving a certain culture, criminality of immigrants and minorities have also created a context for the violence to be justified. What would have ordinarily appalled most people is now considered topical and discussed on primetime news shows and creates space for violence by non-state actors without overt sanction by governments.
These changes in the use of force by states have manifested themselves differently in different places.For example, private prisons in America have been linked to corruption, political lobbying, longer prison sentences and harsher detention of immigrants. This undermines the public function of ‘correction’ that prisons were supposed to perform and reduces its legitimacy in the perception of citizens.
Increase in mob violence and lynching against minorities in India in the last decade has happened with muted or even overt support of the ruling party. There has been a sustained political campaign to create an atmosphere of suspicion against minorities. These perpetrators enjoy impunity and patronage from the power so much so that violence has been normalized and people do not expect the state to even condemn them, let alone persecute.
Clearly, the state does not have a “monopoly” on physical force whatsoever. While these changes and others that suit short-term political objectives might seem useful instruments of power, it undermines their long-term authority in establishing law, order and security for all people.
