Twenty-seven years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a showdown over the country’s nuclear program and continued hostility between Iran and the United States seem inevitable. U.S. forces on four borders and the effective nuclear deterrent of North Korea make nuclear weapons a strategic interest of the Iranian regime and a matter of national pride. For Americans, the war on terror and the phony election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the high pulpit of fundamentalist rhetoric perpetuate the image of a fanatical regime that must be stopped. But too many cards are stacked in Iran’s favor, and none of the options on the table for deterring the nuclear threat is likely to succeed. A radically different option that could constructively reorient troubled American foreign policy in the region must therefore be considered: normalizing relations with Iran.
The current track of multilateral diplomacy is backed by the threat of eventual imposition of economic sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. But Iran pumps more oil than strategic reserves can compensate for, so a cut in its oil exports, caused either by sanctions or a voluntary tactical maneuver, would wreak havoc with global markets. The Security Council member states – especially China, whose strategic oil reserve won’t be active until 2008 – as well as the ayatollahs all know this well.
The military options for destroying Iran’s nuclear capability are likewise problematic. The experience in Iraq is a warning against overreaching American military power, and the neoconservative vision of geopolitical engineering has been discredited. NATO lacks both the troops necessary for a ground invasion of a state three times the size of Iraq and the desire to face the resulting insurgency. An air campaign would at best delay the inevitable for a few years, at worst expedite nuclear development at unknown locations. Targeting the regime would merely play into the hands of Islamic revolutionaries – of whom there would be no shortage to fill the power vacuum – so the government could simply live through an air campaign to fight another day. Similarly, an internal coup is as likely to be led by jihadists as by reformers, and the latter are in no position to pull off another revolution.
Should military action or sanctions replace failed diplomacy, Iran has many ways to retaliate. Its proxy militias could escalate the sectarian wars in Iraq, forcing the United States either to pick sides and suffer further casualties or withdraw in humiliation. Its Revolutionary Guards, long affiliated with global terrorism, could unleash an unprecedented campaign of terror and escalate already tense relations between Islamic states and the West. The notion that Iran could be brought down on its knees without inflicting tremendous harm on its adversaries is a dangerous fantasy.
However, there is an alternative to the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with this potential crisis. It relies on the assumption that the regime could be persuaded that the pride and righteousness it now gains from hostility would be far outweighed by the gains of coexistence. Specifically, the United States could offer Iran a formal pledge of non-aggression and normal diplomatic and economic relations. In exchange, Iran would end its military nuclear development under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Association; it would turn over information and suspects related to global terrorism; and would, in accordance with the American goal for all the nations of that region, recognize Israel following an eventual settlement with the Palestinians. It would be fully accepted into the global community, with all the benefits that entails.
An ideologically cold but practically constructive relationship would then develop, similar to the American alliances with Iran’s Arab neighbors. The flow of information would be opened and any chance for democracy in Iran would be encouraged. The global economy would benefit from more stable oil markets, and the enormous unemployed population in Iran would gradually benefit from foreign capital. Libya recently adopted this path voluntarily, and stands as an example of a terror-sponsoring state that chose to stand down with dignity.
The long-term vision that President Nixon foresaw for China – global recognition leading to economic liberalization and possible governmental reform – was prudent in its time and would be a similarly controversial but wise strategy for Iran. Nixon’s initiative also established a precedent: that coexistence, if at all possible, should trump ideological antagonism; and that the United States should live and let live, if only because the cost of remaking the entire world in our image is too high. This principle has served the world well enough for many years, and refusal even to consider normal relations with Iran is hypocritical.
How much time is left before the situation reaches a breaking point is unknown, but time is not on our side. Likewise, the obvious questions of whether Iran would accept such a proposal in the first place, or be sufficiently trustworthy to follow it, remain unclear. But President Bush’s doctrine of liberalizing the Middle East to support democracy and open markets will never gain a foothold if the United States is constantly in a state of hostility with the strongest regional powers. While many would dismiss normalizing relations with Iran as a foolhardy scenario, the alternatives are too dire and the potential benefits too great to reject it out of hand.
Ben Buckman, a sophomore in the College of Arts and Sciences, is a weekly columnist for The Daily Free Press. He can be reached at [email protected].